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INTRODUCTION
The general underlying objectives of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement are to reduce the distortions and
impediments to international trade and promote effective and adequate protection
of intellectual property rights and facilitate the transfer and dissemination of
technology. However, the endless negotiation or application for special status or
request for modification, in accordance with relevant provisions of the Agreement
(the wiggle room and grey area factors) continue to impede the true implementation
and enforcement of TRIPS. These legal mechanisms used by mostly less developed
member states have continued to speak to the relevancy of the agreement.
=Although these factors are legal, depending on interpretation, they have
tremendously influenced the original intent and spirit of the agreement since coming
into force on January 1, 1995.
A coalition of the major industrialized countries, prominently led by the
United States, with over 90 percent ownership of intellectual property rights,
aggressively campaigned for a universally substantive negotiated agreement to
enforce the rights of owners. The motivation to carve out these specific owners’
rights and elevate them to an international level, grew out of frustration with the
inability of the rules under the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) to
protect intellectual property rights worldwide, which is critical to the international
trading of goods and services. These industrialized nations widely recognized that,
at the inception of the general agreement on trade and tariff in 1947, “less than 10
percent, for example, of United States exports, were tied to intellectual property
when the GATT was negotiated.” 1 According to them, the practice was contributing
to the free-riding practices and creating distortion of fair trade perpetrated by
developing and less developing countries. Moreover, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) conventions “did not attempt to establish the sole set
of norms for the protection of intellectual property rights. These conventions limited
state discretion to requiring a vague national treatment.” 2
Against this backdrop, GATT contracting parties’ multilateral trade
meeting, known as the Uruguay Round negotiations in Uruguay, TRIPS was put on
the table. Finally, “the TRIPS agreement was adopted in Marrakesh, Morocco in
April, 1994.” 3 Articles 7 and 8 of the agreement were adopted with minimal
modifications from proposals submitted by developing and less developed
countries.

1

M.B. RAO & MANJULA GURU, UNDERSTANDING TRIPS: MANAGING KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21 (2003).
2

UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 19 (2005).

3

RAO & GURU, supra note 1, at 29.
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
The need for a retrospective account of the evolvement of TRIPS is
paramount. TRIPS evolved out of the “Great Conventions that have governed
intellectual property rights since 1890: that is, the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971); the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (1967); the Universal Copyright Convention
(1952), and the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Phonograms,
and Broadcasting organizations.” 4
The inception of TRIPS was borne out of the need by industrialized
countries to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights. The TRIPS
Agreement, with minimal exceptions, is widely noted as the most comprehensive
international instrument on intellectual property rights.
The United States feared it would be very difficult to successfully discuss
issues relating to higher standards for intellectual property protection at forums like
the WIPO (administers the Berne and Paris Conventions); the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (administers the
Universal Copyright Convention); and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), without strong resistance from developing countries.
The latter constitute majority membership of these organizations but exert less
effective power at GATT. Hence, the United States decided to flex its muscle as an
influential player in GATT by bringing the issue of intellectual property protection
as a trade-related agenda topic at GATT’s September 1986 meeting in Punta del
Este, Uruguay, most popularly referred to as the Uruguay Round. Prior to the
Uruguay conference, “intellectual property rights were considered as an obstacle to
free trade.” 5
To a great extent, the intellectual property regime was more of an
inconsistent patchwork of standards. The great conventions, listed supra, lacked
teeth, and had no mechanisms in place to impose sanction or address noncompliance. A 1988 WIPO study revealed that ninety-eight signatories to the Paris
Convention only adopted or implemented intellectual property laws that were in
their social, economic, or national welfare interest:
Forty-nine excluded pharmaceutical products from protection, forty-five
excluded animal varieties; forty-four excluded methods of treatment, fortyfour excluded plant varieties, forty-two excluded biological processes for
producing animal or plant varieties, thirty-five excluded food products,
thirty-two excluded computer programs and twenty-two excluded
chemical products. 6
4

Id. at 19.

5 Emir Aly Crowne, Fishing TRIPS: A Look at the History of the Agreement on Trade –
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 2 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 77, 79 (20112012).
6

Id. at 78.
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Moreover, according to an excerpt from an expert commentator, intellectual
property protection rights became a trade related issue based on the following
reasons:
Piracy of intellectual property products had become one of the central
concerns in negotiations on world trade. A concern where both the figures
for projected losses and the rhetoric of condemnation were surprising to
newcomers. The Business Software Alliance reported that the software
industry sustained losses in excess of $15 billion in 1994. The Recording
Industry Association of America claimed that in Thailand alone trade
losses in 1994 amounted to $2.245 billion. The International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA) reported that copyright piracy in 36 countries had
resulted in $8 billion losses to US companies in 1993. The industries under
the auspices of the IIPA lost an estimated $15 to $17 billion due to
international piracy in 1993. 7
At the Uruguay Conference, the United States led the industrial world in
effectively bullying developing and less developed countries and others to the
GATT-WTO negotiation table on trade-related issues. The United States
“threatened to impose multilateral/unilateral sanctions under Section 301 of its 1974
Trade Act and the European prototype, Council Regulation 264/84, if these
countries rejected discussion and agreement to protect intellectual property rights.” 8
At the GATT-WTO Ministerial Conference in Uruguay, the developing
and less developed countries were very concerned, to say the least, and reluctant to
participate. They largely viewed the United States proposed agenda item as an
attempt on the part of the developed countries to institute excessive protection of
intellectual property rights. In developing and less developed countries’ views,
“over protection of intellectual property rights could impede the transfer of
technology and increase the cost of agricultural and pharmaceutical products.” 9
These commodities are heavily relied upon by developing countries for the day-today well-being of the populace. The developing and less developed countries
proposed, among other things, the need to maintain flexibility in implementing
economic and social objectives under the TRIPS agreement.

7

Kingsley K.K. Ampofo, Enabling Implementation of Intellectual Property Protection in
Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Role of the World Bank and the
World Trade Organization, 20 U. GHANA L.J. 26, 36-37 (1996-1999).
8

Crowne, supra note 5, at 85.

9

Id. at 87.
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With the inception of the TRIPS Agreement to protect intellectual property
rights, a new phenomenon in international trade, a resolution regarding
pharmaceutical products was adopted (the Doha Declaration) at the fourth session
of the World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in
November of 2001. This resolution permitted mostly developing countries to invoke
paragraph 6 of the agreement to support public health. The Public Health
Declaration states “each member has the right to grant compulsory license(s) and
the freedom to determine, for the purposes of issuing a compulsory license, what
each member regard as constituting a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency.” The Declaration further states: “the TRIPS Agreement does not
and should not prevent members from taking measures to allow national
governments to apply various legal measures such as ‘compulsory licenses’ in
situations of public health crises.” 10 The compulsory licensing procedure allowed a
third party to manufacture certain cheaper generic drugs on behalf of a developing
country lacking manufacturing pharmaceutical capacity.
The less developed countries have not always looked kindly on TRIPS.
However, under the terms of the WTO, GATT’s successor organization, a
commitment was made to lower trade barriers and eliminate regimes of unilateral
trade sanctions for members who would ratify the TRIPS Agreement. The
ratification of the TRIPS Agreement was a requirement for membership in the
WTO. Hence, “TRIPS sounded very attractive to the ears of the less developed
countries.” 11
Moreover, to address the multiple concerns of the developing and less
developed countries toward the TRIPS Agreement, a transitional period provision
was made part of the TRIPS Agreement to address the issues raised by developing
and less developed countries relative to the implementation of the Agreement.
The most striking elements of the TRIPS Agreement are Articles 7 and 8.
These key component areas give legitimacy to the Agreement, and impact all other
areas of the Agreement. As a core provisional structure of the Agreement, these
articles are systematically resorted to in the implementation and interpretation of the
Agreement. The two all-important articles are categorized as ‘Objectives and
Principles’ of the treaty respectively:
Article 7- Objectives
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of the rights and obligations.
10

Marla L. Mellino, The TRIPS Agreement: Helping or Hurting Least Developed Countries’
Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals? 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1349,
1359 (2009-2010).
11

Crowne, supra note 5, at 80.
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Article 8 – Principles
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
social-economic and technological development, provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology. 12
The text of Articles 7 and 8 was essentially adopted from the draft language
of developing countries led by India and Brazil. It was directly incorporated (with
limited modifications) into the final Draft Agreement as an appeasement to disabuse
developing and less developed countries of their perception, i.e., that the TRIPS
Agreement was essentially a manipulative instrument of the developed countries to
impede trade and the transfer of technology. Articles 7 and 8, most importantly,
provide interpretative guidance to all members and institutions of the WTO.
According to Peter K. Yu, Articles 7 and 8 under the TRIPS Agreement
can be interpreted in number of ways. They can be seen as:
a. a legal instrument- used in the interpretation and implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement
b. an economic instrument- used to facilitate innovation, technology
transfer, knowledge production and promotion of social and economic
welfare and development
c. a political instrument that provides much needed balance to make the
Agreement a legitimate bargain between developed and lessdeveloped member countries
d. a structure that bridges the gap between the TRIPS regime and other
international regimes, and
e. a global instrument that has sowed the seeds for the development of
new international norms both within and without the TRIPS regime. 13
The Uruguay Rounds were finally concluded in Marrakesh, Morocco in
April, 1994. The conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement did not address the
skepticisms the developing countries held about implementing the “often
ambiguously worded substantive rules of the Agreement.” 14

12 Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L REV.
979, 1000-10 (2009-2010).
13

14

Yu, supra note 12, at 1046.
Slade, supra note 13, at 986.

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

113

The 2001 Doha, Qatar Declaration of the WTO relative to TRIPS and
public health was a clear manifestation of the need to clarify the many ambiguities
the TRIPS Agreement contains. The Declaration further underscores the need that
“intellectual property protection can never prevail where doing so undermines other
development objectives.” 15
Article 8, as an interpretative tool, reinforces the common practice
indicated above that “members have the right to favor other policies should a
national situation dictate. In the realm of public health, social, domestic and national
security need, members have the obligation to refrain from questioning acts of other
members as provided for by the provisions under these articles.” 16
II. THE HURDLES OF COMPLIANCE
As previously discussed in other areas, during the Uruguay round of
negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement, there was a serious disagreement between
the developed and developing countries regarding the inclusion of intellectual
property rights in the then GATT framework of trade negotiation. The developed
countries successfully bargained to embody intellectual property within the WTO
system. This was a smart move to obtain legal international backing. On the other
hand, developing countries were cognizant of the enormous burden placed on them
for decades to come. Worst of all, the less developed countries (LDCs) were not
well represented during the Uruguay round of negotiation. “Out of about 31 LDCs,
only one took an active part in the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement –Tanzania
in East Africa.” 17 Moreover, the LDCs were put in a very difficult dilemma as
discussed early in other parts of this work. Except for certain differential and special
treatment provided for under Articles 66 and 67, there is only one way of
participating in WTO. The WTO imposes compliance with TRIPS to become a
member of the global trading system under the aegis of WTO. There is no choice in
subscribing to TRIPS separate from the freedom to participate in WTO. The LDCs
are characterized as the poorest and weakest segment of the international
community. The social and economic quality of life of the population in these
countries is generally hindered by extreme poverty, economic vulnerability and
socio- political instability. These countries are categorized based on three criteria:
“low income, human capital status, and economic vulnerability.” 18

15

16

Id. at 985.
Id. at 987.

17

Omolo Joseph Agutu, Least Developed Countries and the TRIPS Agreement: Arguments
for a Shift to Voluntary Compliance, 20 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 429 (2012).

18

Id. at 426.
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Many commentators have argued that LDCs face enormous tasks in
implementing the TRIPS agreement. They believed that LDCs are walking the exact
route that present day industrialized countries walked. The currently industrialized
countries at the time had no TRIPs regime hanging over them. They went through
the phases of imitation, reverse engineering and learning without regard to using
other inventions and innovations. During the early stages of industrialization, there
were weaker protections and outright disregard for infringement.
There are high costs attached to the implementation and enforcement of the
TRIPS Agreement. There are costs imposed on governments in general, especially
those of the LDCs. The costs may be both direct and indirect in nature. Direct costs
may involve administrative fees along with the cost of training, reviewing, and
drafting of laws to implement the Agreement. While indirect costs may vary from
country to country irrespective of economic and social status, they may include
welfare costs such as increased prices, loss of jobs, and inhibition of competition
and innovation due to heavy reliance on imported commodities, especially in LDCs.
Business and finance laws in these countries were not designed to accommodate the
TRIPS regime. As a result of these disparities, members are mandated to amend
legislation to bring them into compliance with TRIPS. Furthermore, countries are
required to establish regulatory departments and other administrative bodies to
regulate and enforce the laws. Due to multiplicity of needs and scarcity of resources,
LDCs are faced with an impossible choice or a catch 22 in deciding whether to fund
protection of intellectual property rights at the expense of more immediate needs
like healthcare, education, agriculture, and development of other social sectors.
Omolo Agutu quoted the World Bank reflection on LDCs dilemma:
Given other pressing needs in education, health and policy reform it is
questionable whether the LDCs would be willing to absorb these costs, or
indeed, whether they would achieve much social payoff from investing in
them. Moreover, note that poor countries are extremely scarce in trained
administrators and judges, suggesting that one of the largest costs would
be to divert scarce professional and technical resources out of potentially
more productive activities. Indeed, in many poor countries, devoting more
resources to the protection of tangible property rights, such as land, could
benefit poor people more directly than the protection of intellectual
property. 19

19

Id. at 432.
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There is no doubt that the cost of instituting an adequate system to protect
an intellectual property regime is substantial. There are fixed and recurrent costs.
Most of the fixed costs, which are significant, come by way of developing local
institutions in line with TRIPS standards. These may include, but are not limited to
developing examination and registration offices and equipment; drafting and
adopting acceptable administrative procedures; and training examiners, judges, and
custom authorities. The recurrent costs will continue to rise as more and more
intellectual property comes into use.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
provided some rough estimates highlighting the enormous cost of compliance with
TRIPS from selected developing countries. It cited costs averaging well over
millions of dollars in fixed and recurrent costs as estimated by experts from Chile,
Egypt, and Bangladesh in its 1996 report. Indeed, this is an indication that
significant costs have to be borne by these poor countries in implementing an
effective system, which would ultimately divert scarce competing resources away
from areas of great necessities-health, education, and social welfare programs. In
light of the economic toil that it takes to administer an effective intellectual property
rights system as demanded by the TRIPS Agreement, small and poor countries “are
unlikely to develop much commitment to institutional reform for some time. Unless
they are able to recover these costs through fees, technical and financial assistance
from abroad, and take advantage of cooperative international agreements to help cut
costs, it remains to be seen any presentment of effective participation.” 20
The area allocated to enforcement in the Agreement forecasts major
successes to be achieved with respect to its impact on developing and least
developing countries in the areas of technology transfer and innovation. Article 41
contains general obligations expected of each member, irrespective of economic
status. It provides in part that members
shall ensure that enforcement procedures . . . are available under their
national laws so as to permit effective action against any act of
infringement of intellectual property rights . . ., including expeditious
remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a
deterrent to further infringements . . . these procedures shall be applied in
such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and
to provide for safe guards against their abuse . . . enforcement shall be fair
and equitable…not unnecessarily complicated or costly or entail
unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays . . . and that nothing under
this article creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of
resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the
enforcement of law in general. 21

20 Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic
Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 467 (2001).
21

DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 285 (2d ed.
2003).
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However, the issues of enforcement, especially for small and poor
countries, come with a series of complex problems. First, TRIPS enforcement
agreement is based on broad standards. This point implies that the interpretation of
standards is left to the norms and caprices of each member as it sees fit or in
accordance with its legal system. With respect to localized enforcement, the
capacity of each nation-state to enforce policies at local levels is rife with entrenched
localized corruption and cronyism that are well-institutionalized ways of life in most
developing and least developing countries. Moreover, the agents of enforcement—
the courts, customs and police—are poorly trained and often corrupt. They have
performed in a way that continues to hamper effective enforcement as envisaged by
the TRIPS Agreement. It is an understatement, to say the least, that many legal
systems, especially in the developing and least developed countries, are not well
adapted to the legal standards used as a basis for TRIPS. Failure to adapt to these
standards could result in weak protection for foreign intellectual property right
holders.
III. THE ILLUSIVE PROMISE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INNOVATION TO
DEVELOPING AND LESS DEVELOPED MEMBER COUNTRIES
During the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, developing and least
developed countries were concerned, as discussed in other parts of this work, that
accepting the multilateral TRIPS Agreement would incur significant costs of
compliance. Moreover, a fair amount of coercion was in place. The United States
and the European Union made the TRIPS Agreement a “‘single undertaking,’ with
all of the individual agreements as ‘integral parts’ binding on all members.” 22 And
the path to membership in the WTO, successor of GATT, was via TRIPS. An
assumption of membership in the WTO system was an automatic withdrawal from
GATT. The consequence of not accepting TRIPS and its collateral agreements was
the loss of access these countries had to US and EU markets under the former
GATT. Indeed, developing and least developed countries were aware of the high
costs of not accepting membership into the WTO. Despite the furious objections,
the developing and least developing countries eventually accepted the TRIPS
Agreement.
In order to mitigate some of the impacts of compliance and by way of
concession-inducement, the developed countries undertook certain commitments to
provide financial and technical support to developing and least developed countries
in the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. This loose commitment was
incorporated under Articles 66 and 67 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 66 is
captioned ‘Least-Developed Country Members’ and states in part:
1. In view of the special needs and requirements of leastdeveloped country Members, their economic, financial and
administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a

22 Poppy S. Winanti & Alasdair R. Young, Complying with Unwelcome Rules? Developing
Countries and the TRIPS Agreement, 2 INDIAN J. INT’L ECON. L. 52, 58 (2009).
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viable technological base, such Members shall not be required to apply
the provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3 [National
Treatment], 4 [Most-Favored-Nation Treatment], and 5 [Multilateral
Agreements on Acquisition or Maintenance of Protection], for a
period of 10 years from the date of application . . . [and t]he Council
for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-developed
country Member, accord extensions of this period.
2. Developed country Members shall provide incentives to
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed
country Members . . .to create a sound and viable technological base. 23
In order to facilitate the implementation of Article 66, a provision was also
incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement under Article 67 specifically relating to the
increase in the transfer and access to technology and innovation to the developing
and less-developed member countries. The preamble of the TRIPS Agreement drew
particular attention to “the special needs of the least-developed country Members in
respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and
regulations . . . to enable them create a sound and viable technological base.” 24
Moreover, from a proposal tabled by developing countries, Article 7 states, “[t]he
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology . . . in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare . . . .” 25
Article 67 serves as a reinforcement or a complimentary tool to Article 66
under the TRIPS Agreement. Article 67 provides in part that:
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed
country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms
and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favor of developing
and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation shall include
assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights . . . on the prevention of their
abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment . . . of
domestic offices and agencies relevant to . . . the training of personnel. 26

23

RAO & GURU, supra note 1, at 308.

24

GERVAIS, supra note 21, at 76.

25 Amanda Watson, Does TRIPS Increase Technology Transfer to the Developing World: The
Empirical Evidence, 20 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 253, 254 (2011).
26

Gervais, supra note 21, at 353.
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Researchers over the years have tried to gauge the best method by which
the transfer of technology to the developing and less-developed world can be
measured. Amanda Watson, Department of Economics, University of Florida, in an
information and communications technology law review article, first inquired
whether “the TRIPS Agreement allows poorer nations greater access to technology
and innovation or the Agreement is simply meant to benefit only the developed
world.” 27
There is a general perception among developed countries, also buttressed
by the principles and objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, that intellectual property
protection should contribute to technical innovation and the transfer of technology.
However, developing and less developed countries dispute this assertion, and
contend that “strong [intellectual property rights] laws keep poorer nations from
taking advantage of the imitation and reverse-engineering techniques others have
used to build their technological bases and catch up with competitors.” 28
The above argument is countered by some advocates of robust intellectual
property rights protection. These advocates contend that flouting international laws
and resorting to practices such as reverse-engineering, imitation and piracy to suit
ones’ advantage hinders access to investment and technology in the developing and
less developed world. These advocates also surmise that companies would fear
losing their technologies to leakages in nations with weak intellectual property
rights laws. thereby avoiding investment in such countries altogether. Overall, there
are indications that point to the fact that stronger intellectual property rights
protection tends to lead to higher levels of technological transfer and innovation
mostly in the form of direct foreign investment. The increase in the granting of
patents and licenses may be a new way of providing technical assistance to
developing and less developed countries. Data on patents and licenses may be a way
of gauging the extent of technological transfer and innovation in the developing and
less developed world, an indication of fulfillment under WTO’s TRIPS Articles 7
and 8. The spread of technological innovation has a direct link to some form of
licensing and granting of patents, and overall intellectual property protection.
Watson cites researchers’ findings that increasing the strength of patent laws raises
foreign direct investment, and that the positive intellectual property rights protection
tends to also boost the research and development level in high-income developing
countries. The India drug industry is a microcosm of the rest of the developing
world. According to Watson, researchers “using data from three hundred and fifteen
Indian pharmaceutical companies, found that India’s adoption of TRIPS patent
protection in 1995 increased research and development in investment and in patents

27

Watson, supra note 25, at 253.

28

Id. at 254.
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filed by Indian pharmaceutical firms.” 29 In 2002, India was the world’s largest
producer of generic drugs.
Also quoting from case-study research conducted by Michael Ryan of
World Development, Watson informed that “heightened intellectual property laws
increased biomedical innovation in Brazil via public-private partnerships, i.e.
companies are more willing to invest money if they know they will reap profits from
their research (patents) and if they do not have to shoulder all the risk themselves.” 30
Irrespective of this positive development, there is no significant data to indicate
whether more intellectual property rights protection laws will increase or decrease
access to drugs, or will increase or decrease prices.
Examining the short-and long-term effects of TRIPS implementation,
Watson cited research by McCalman that appeared in the Journal of International
Economics (2005), which estimated that, “the net receipt from transaction from
IPRs to the United States from the TRIPS Agreement is estimated to be up to 40%
of the gains associated with trade liberalization; while developing countries made
net payment of up to 64% of the gains they receive from trade liberalization. He
further posits that, while everyone benefits, developed countries gain more than
developing ones.” 31
The uneven gains envisioned by developing and less developed countries
led drafters of the TRIPS Agreement to include the Article 66.2 provision, which
requires developed nations to provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in
their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer
to less developed country members in order to enable them to create a sound and
viable technological base.
Quoting another researcher, Intan Hamdan-Livrameto, Watson noted that
most developing and less developed countries, especially in the pharmaceutical
industry, are delaying implementation of the TRIPS Agreement as provided for by
continuous deadline extensions (next transitional period has been extended to July
1, 2021 or while a particular country ceases to be in the least developed category if
that happens before 2021). Intellectual property right reform regulations may serve
as a valuable short-term signal to investors, but proof of effective enforcement may
be more important in the long-term. Intan Hamdan-Livrameto, according to Watson,
noted that “one unit rise in enforcement causes foreign direct investment to rise by
6.7% and licensing to rise by 1.9% in countries with little imitative capabilitiesmeaning TRIPS enforcement has a positive impact on foreign direct investment
flows.” 32

29

Id. at 269.

30

Id. at 270.

31

Id. at 271-72.

32

Id. at 273.
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Overall, it can be discerned from the above review that there is significant
empirical evidence to indicate that a positive relationship exists between robust
TRIPS-inspired intellectual property right laws and increased access to technology.
Despite the positive outlook, there is a caveat to the extent that most developing and
less developed countries tend not to benefit or, in other words, are harmed or limited
by a “shortage of resources, a weak intellectual property infrastructure, lack of
skilled personnel and inadequate awareness of and information on the various
treaties and conventions in the field of intellectual property.” 33
Most middle income-developing and less developed countries are
increasingly becoming reservoirs of transferred technologies from developed
countries. Developing, and especially less developed countries’ abilities to
implement and enforce TRIPS and related provisions in accordance with the
agreement timetable of implementation is a daunting task, particularly in the high
technology area. General compliance began as far back January 1, 1996, one year
after entering into force, January 1, 1995.
At the Uruguay Round of negotiation, developed countries were more
focused on strong protection of intellectual property rights, while the less developed
members were strongly opposed to the idea of outright application in scope. Due to
large scale discrepancies of human capital and intellectual property structural
inadequacies, as discussed in other areas, a “mechanism was adopted under Articles
7, 8 and other related provisions to allow less developed countries to obtain further
extensions to fully implement TRIPS as needs dictate.” 34
A WTO member state that is less developed may delay implementation of
TRIPS-compliant laws for up to 10 years. It may request and obtain extensions of
this ten-year period from the council for TRIPS.
The core principle areas of noteworthiness of the TRIPS Agreement
focusing on the developing world are the non-discrimination principles: national
treatment and most-favored nation provisions under Articles 3 and 4 which
essentially state in part:
Article 3- National TreatmentEach member shall accord to the nationals of other members
treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals
with regard to protection of intellectual property . . . 35
Article 4- Most –favored Nation Treatment-

33

Third U.N. Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Interactive Thematic Session,
Intellectual Property and Development, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.191/L.6 (May 17, 2001).
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John E. Giust, Noncompliance with TRIPS by Developed and Developing Countries: Is
TRIPS Working, 8 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 69, 96 (1997-1998).
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With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any
advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by a member to
the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the nationals of all other members . . . . 36
According to Professor Carlos Correa, “the primary effect of combining
minimum standards with national treatment is to ensure that all members of the
Agreement can expect the application of the same minimum standards in other
member countries, irrespective of status. And without national treatment, members
could be free to apply one law to its domestic nationals and another to foreign
nationals.” 37
Prior to TRIPS, under GATT, now WTO, members were not permitted to
apply different taxes, levies, laws, or regulations to ‘like products.’ This practice
gives rise to countries attaching different meanings or classifications to products,
which led to multiplicity of disputes. The TRIPS non-discrimination principles
require only like treatment of nationals. There is absence of any ‘like product’ test
in the broad non-discrimination principles of TRIPS.
Professor Correa also cites TRIPS Article 27 as a clear example of nondiscriminatory principle incorporated into the Agreement relative to patents. It states
in part: “patents shall be available and patents rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether
products are imported or locally produced.” 38
IV. LIMITATIONS OF TRIPS
Professor Correa, irrespective of numerous exceptions and nondiscriminatory principles incorporated into the Agreement, strongly believes that
these flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement have not produced results that really
assist in the development of local innovation and technology transfer. He surmises
that the “various exceptions to exclusive intellectual property rights are not strong
enough to achieve the intended goals.” 39
There are multitudes of commentaries, studies and analyses critical of the
ineffectiveness of the transfer of technology and innovation; and the extension of
financial and technical assistance as mandated by Articles 66 and 67 of the TRIPS
Agreement to developing and least developed countries. In his article, Least
Developed Countries and the TRIPS Agreement…, Omolo Joseph Agutu,
enumerated several problems associated with TRIPS provisions aforementioned. He

36

Id. at 102.

37 Research Handbook on the Interpretation and Enforcement of Intellectual Property under
the WTO Rules, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE WTO 12 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010).
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began by noting “that TRIPS is relatively clear on [developed] country obligations
regarding IP protection, but remarkably vague on what would comprise satisfactory
compliance.” 40
Quoting a 2002 report of the Intellectual Property Commission, Agutu
noted further: “[t]he TRIPS has strengthened the global protection offered to
suppliers of technology, but there is no international framework to ensure that the
transfer of technology takes place within a competitive framework which minimizes
the restrictive technology licensing practices with which the Code was
concerned.” 41
The developed countries are required to incentivize their institutions to
transfer technology to developing and least developing countries. He sees this as a
mockery of the IPR protection mechanism system. He further noted that “no country
would motivate its business enterprises to transfer protected technology into the
wilderness; there must be some form of protection in the importing country to
receive, protect and nurture the technology; it would be unrealistic to expect
developed countries to effectively motivate transfer of restricted technologies by
their business enterprises into the public domain in least developed countries.” 42
Another point of criticism leveled against the TRIPS Agreement has to do
with failure of the Agreement to clearly define a developed, developing and less
developed country. The text of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 66 lacks the
definition of which countries fall under either category. This inconclusiveness casts
doubt on effective enforcement mechanisms.
Although mandated by the ministerial conference of 2001 and the TRIPS
Council to set-up a reporting system for developed countries as subscribed under
Article 66, “there is no standard or uniform format for filing reports detailing
amount and kind of technology transfer occurring over a specific period of time.” 43
The reports are said to be broad, non-specific and irregular, some countries failing
to comply at all. The present non-compliance and non-interventionist approach
reflects some of the weaknesses and imbalances the Agreement contains.
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Another shortcoming of Article 66 under the Agreement is requiring
government to exert indirect pressure on private enterprises to transfer technology
to developing and least developed countries. In most industrialized countries,
governments do not wield the power to mandate how private entities use their
technologies. The language of the Code in effect defeats the commitment made by
developed countries at the negotiation table. Most developed country members are
resorting to legal technicalities in attempting to renege on their treaty obligations.
Most posit that companies and institutions can only be expected “to invest and
transfer their technology to a specific country, if a number of framework conditions
in the beneficiary country actually exist.” 44 Developed countries further defend that
Article 66 only mandated them to provide incentives (carrots) to private institutions,
without any obligation whatsoever to coerce private entities to share their
technologies with developing and less developing countries.
In accordance with the language of Article 67 of the Agreement, developed
countries are supposed to offer technical and financial assistance to developing
countries and least developed member countries upon request and on mutually
agreed terms and conditions. The assistance is supposed to cover preparation of laws
and regulations and the establishment of local offices, including staff training.
However, many researchers and commentators, tend to dismiss the effectiveness of
Article 67. Agutu, citing UNCTAD in its critique, stated:
Overall, the support programs do not work in such a way that is
developmentally effective, either because of their inappropriate
design or the manner in which they are implemented. The nature
of these programs reflects the weak bargaining power of the least
developed member countries. They are forced to accept what they
are offered. The commercial interests of rich countries and
differences in interpretation between the least developed
countries and their development partners also is a hindering factor
in the effective implementation of programs. 45
The act of betrayal by developed countries coupled with the deficiencies
of Article 67 is reflected in the manner in which the developed countries vehemently
opposed the establishment of an independent evaluative mechanism of their report
on technical and financial assistance. They opted for a bilateral assessment
mechanism. One knows only the efficacy of such bilateral trade relations, in lieu of
the inequality of economic status subsisting between the parties to the TRIPS
Agreement.
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V. THE WAY FORWARD
Perhaps developed member countries enthusiastic about strengthened
global compliance with TRIPS have to a take into account the following concerns
in the interest of the socially, economically, and politically vulnerable member
countries to make TRIPS more relevant in attaining the goals claimed in its preamble
and under Article 7 of the Agreement.
The developed member countries, who realistically believed in robust trade
under the TRIPS Agreement, are aware that TRIPS implementation and
enforcement is not progressing as envisaged. Some commentators have come to the
conclusion that in order to significantly minimize the current status of stagnation in
the LDCs, there is an urgent need to:
1. Review the WTO system with the view of amending it to allow LDCs
not to comply with TRIPS either until they cease to be classified as
LDCs or until they decide on their own volition to implement the
Agreement-they can remain part of the WTO system, but not be
coerced to apply TRIPS to the letter, and
2. To make TRIPS membership optional and compliance voluntary
which would minimize the costly need in establishing IPR regimes.
This is a way of providing room for self-identification of needs and
gradual or systematic allocation and utilization of resources in meeting
the competing domestic needs and TRIPS obligations at the same time
without enduring economic hardship.
Although the aforementioned points continue to haunt TRIPS implementation
and enforcement, it seems that some influential members remain oblivious to reality.
They continue to push back and unrealistically opine that the train has left the station
and there is no turning back. These proponents of the status quo have argued, among
other things, that:
1. An amendment to allow for delayed compliance would lead to
fragmentation of the WTO system;
2. To make membership optional at this point in time would mean the reversal
of the gains made by the WTO;
3. These proposals might undermine the popular acceptance of TRIPS in the
long-run; and
4. Mandatory compliance would guard against the isolation of LDCs holding
to certain generally acceptable international standards.
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More fully, it is important to note that success of TRIPS is tied to the well-being
of the WTO system and vice versa. The prospect of implementation and
enforcement by developing and less developed countries has become the Achilles
heel. As main architects of the TRIPS Agreement, developed member countries
have major responsibility to see that developing and less developed members
succeed. The success of these member countries would ultimately contribute to
robust and unhindered global trade. Thus far, the successes and failures of TRIPS
are mixed. But, the failures are attributable to the lack of commitment by developed
member countries to address the issues of concern of developing and less developed
countries that have continued to stall the effective implementation and enforcement
of the objectives and principles for which it was created. The failure by a majority
of developing and less developed member countries to meet or support full
compliance after twenty-two years of entry into force calls for a renegotiation if
TRIPS is to continue to be relevant, globally.
There is a way going forward in achieving better impact of the TRIPS
Agreement on, especially, the LDCs. There is general recognition on the part of the
international community of countries in the LDCs category, which is based on the
fact that these labelled countries face serious disadvantages in their development
efforts as a result of weaknesses in their human capital and economic structures.
Under the burden of these disadvantages, they (LDCs) are faced with the risk of the
inability to measure up to the rest of global economy and greater difficulty in
escaping the unending poverty trap. There is unanimity within the international
community for the rationale in granting LDCs special treatment and international
support. However, the reason for being in this category, weak socio-economic
structures, and promise of transformation have remained largely unfulfilled. The
size of the category of LDCs keeps growing. The fact that most of the LDC members
of TRIPS continue to fall behind in meeting their obligations calls for a critical
review of the effectiveness of some of key elements of the Agreement. Minimally,
some LDCs have made some progress. There is need to formulate country-specific
packages in the allocation of resources and extension of assistance in furtherance
with compliance of the TRIPS Agreement. Unless the key players in the WTO can
provide a path and present some willingness to ensure that TRIPS is relevant to the
transformation of the global economy, the economically handicapped and
vulnerable countries will indefinitely continue to kick the can down the road in the
implementation and enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement.
CONCLUSION
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One did not need a fortuneteller to predict the daunting task ahead of the
implementation and enforcement of the WTO’s TRIPS agreement by all sides,
especially the vulnerable least developed member states. The inception of TRIPS at
the GATT-WTO Uruguay Round of negotiation, under the heavy-handed economic
influence of the U.S. and its Western European allies, was acrimonious and
antagonistic, to say the least. After twenty-two years of TRIPS entry into force, one
would expect that member countries would be at least in compliance or on board at
some appreciable level. However, the economic, technological, and governance
inequality subsisting among member countries is so wide that it will take decades,
or perhaps more than half a century to begin to feel the wind of full implementation
and enforcement. In some quarters, there are calls to revisit the Agreement, complete
renegotiation of TRIPS, suspension of the obligations of LDC member countries,
voluntary compliance, and a desire to retool under a new world order, etc.
In the wake of enormous structural constraints, such as shortages of
resources, a weak intellectual infrastructure, a lack of skilled personnel (IP judges,
administrators, etc.), and inadequate awareness of information on collateral treaties
and conventions in the field of intellectual property by responsible institutionsbusinesses, governmental agencies, higher institutions of learning, and local
population, the WIPO, identified some key areas of institutional building to further
the IP capacity of developing and least developed member countries in compliance
with the TRIPS Agreement:
1. Transfer of IP knowledge to LDCs in specific areas needed to build up
knowledge capital in the public and private sectors;
2. WIPO worldwide Academy could offer IP training designed to meet
individual needs of LDCs—distance learning programs, customized
training courses for managers, IP technical staff, government agencies
and other collateral sectors; policy training programs for policy
advisers, decision makers and diplomats; diploma courses and degree
programs;
3. Installment of WIPO services, equipment, and deployment of
personnel on a long-term basis to help build and modernize IP offices
in the LDCs;
4. Assist in the development of comprehensive and user-friendly
promotional information materials and training programs for LDCs
(web-based form and through seminars and workshops).
The World Intellectual Property Organization has made, over the years,
tremendous efforts in the implementation of these programs to resolve some of the
structural problems in least developing member countries.
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Despite the expenditure of capital and human resources in developing and
expanding the IP capacities of LDCs to implement and enforce the TRIPS
Agreement, the least developed world continues to lag behind. The continuous
malaise draws several intriguing questions for reflection. Is there an urgent need to
revisit the Agreement to revamp it in its entirety in relation to implementation and
enforcement? Is the failure of the developed member countries to honor their
promises as laid out under Articles 66.2 and 67 a contributing factor? These and
many issues and concerns that are more critical to the survival of the core intended
principles and objectives of the current Agreement can be only legitimately
addressed at a Uruguay-like conference. The developed member countries would
have to be willing and honest in committing to the retooling of TRIPS for a global
relevancy. One can objectively assume that most developed member countries are
sensitive to the needs of LDCs (perhaps this may not be the case). It is fair enough
to support certain waivers and amendments to the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement in
order to make it more relevant in achieving its general goal of protecting IPRs and
its specific goal of implementation of TRIPS.
In the meantime, developing and less developed member countries have to
exhibit to the developed members that they ‘mean business.’ Over the years and
before the TRIPS Agreement, the World Intellectual Property (WIPO) and related
institutions have extended and continue to provide financial and technical assistance
to developing and less developing countries in the implementation and enforcement
of the TRIPS Agreement. However, most of these less privileged member states
cannot produce any evidence of serious improvement in intellectual property system
organization in light of the numerous assistance.
Take the case of Liberia in West Africa. It has been a long-standing
recipient of technical assistance from WIPO and related U.N. institutions. There is
evidence in historical records that the “Liberia IP office has one of oldest records of
IP rights dating back to 1897.” 46 But, there is little or nothing meaningful it can
show for the continuous engagement. It appears that the single greatest
“achievement” was the enactment of the two pieces of legislation in 1997 and 2003.
Liberia’s IP system remains in a dismal state. A WIPO commissioned assessment
report in 2009, based on a request by the government of Liberia, concluded with
high degree of accuracy the following:
• The country has no intellectual property policy framework to implement
the intellectual property legislation;
• The Intellectual Property Act of 2003 is poorly drafted and suffers from
lack of clarity, inconsistency, gaps and is virtually incapable of being
implemented (the law looks more like a draft than a law);

46 Getachew Mengistie & Marisella Ouma, Intellectual Property Development Plan for the
Republic of Liberia, at 73 (2009),
http://www.moci.gov.lr/doc/LiberiaFinalConsolidatedIPDP.pdf.

128

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

•
•
•

•
•
•

•

•

The law has gaps, for example, it does not provide for the duration of a
patent; it does not incorporate utility model to protect minor inventions;
The non-implementation of some provisions of the law is affecting the
operation of the Industrial Property Office;
The Industrial Property Office suffers from lack of capacity and inadequate
financial resources;
o The Office is understaffed and poorly composed. Of the 11 staff
members, there are no lawyers, engineers, or professionals with
science backgrounds to deal with tasks which may involve legal
and technical issues; there are literally no patent examiners;
o The Office is poorly equipped. There are no electronic resources
such as: computers, printers, scanners, faxes, telephone apparatus,
and photocopiers; and no basic facility resources such as: air
conditioning, electricity, water, vehicle, etc.;
o The Office has poor systems of operation that may affect its
functions and users of its services. There are no statistics
regarding the number of applications filed by and titles granted to
residents and foreigners due to poor record keeping and
management;
o The records are not kept appropriately. The law requires the
Office to maintain separate registers for patents, industrial
designs, and marks. To the contrary, patents and marks are put in
the same register. There are no statistics on patents, trademarks,
design applications and titles due to the non-availability of
records coupled with the lack of a recording system. There is no
way of determining whether a mark is registered. This may be
contributing to the high rate of piracy and counterfeiting, with no
way of deterring potential infringers;
The Industrial Property Office does not have a system of notification of
rights holders. This affects rights holders who do not have intellectual
property agents;
The Intellectual Property Office has no financial autonomy. It lacks an
adequate budget and does not have the authority to make use of the funds
it generates;
The Director General’s vested power of handling complaints of
infringement cases and at the same time trying to resolve disputes through
arbitration may affect the core functions of the Office. Tracing
infringement and instituting action is the responsibility of the right holders;
The Industrial Property Office lacks the capacity to discharge its functions
effectively. It does not have qualified engineers and scientists to make a
decision whether or not an application fulfills substantive requirements of
patentability before granting a patent;
The Office does not have an organizational structure or a system of checks
and balances. The division of labor between staff is made on an ad hoc
basis;
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The level of awareness about intellectual property and its benefits among
politicians, researchers, higher learning institutions and research and
development organizations is extremely low. This core group has very
limited knowledge about intellectual property;
There are limited activities made to raise intellectual property awareness
amongst the general population. The Intellectual Property Office has no
outreach programs or strategies;
The lack of capacity to implement the laws has even made it difficult to
protect the market from large volumes of counterfeiting and piracy rampant
in the country. It is worth noting that counterfeit and pirated products
transshipped from neighboring countries are much higher than those
protected and produced in the country;
There is little or no enforcement system. The power of enforcement is the
responsibility of the judiciary, police force, customs department, and IPO.
They have done very little to stop the entry of infringing products,
primarily due to lack of awareness and capacity;
There is fragmentation of entities involved in the administration of
intellectual property system. 47

The problems highlighted above outlining Liberia’s dismal IP system are
just the tip of the iceberg. Liberia’s dismal IP system is a mirror image of less
developed member countries similarly situated. The fundamental basics for an
IP protection mechanism simply do not exist. It would require enormous
resources, time, effort in every direction, shape and form to elevate the system
to an internationally acceptable standard. Does the government of the day have
the political guts and spine to make decisions that would change the status quo?
Are the major stakeholders of intellectual property rights willing and prepared
to decisively move the system in the direction as enshrined under the preamble
of the TRIPS Agreement? The ball remains in the courts of both developed and
developing/less developed member countries, but more in the former.

47

Id. at 73-74.
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